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In writing this paper, I made use of the draft of an earlier paper, “Ramsey as an
Inferentialist,” delivered at the Third Meeting on Pragmatism: Agency, Inference and the Origins
of Analytic Philosophy in Granada, Spain in the spring 2006, organized by María J. Frápolli. I
wish to thank the participants for their comments and acknowledge my debt to
discussions with Nils-Eric Sahlin and François Latraverse for discussions over the years
on the topic of this paper.
 
1. Assessing Ramsey’s Impact on Wittgenstein
1 One may  establish  links  between Wittgenstein  and pragmatism in  an  abstract  albeit
superficial way à la Rorty,1 or one may try and establish them contextually, i.e., in terms of
what historical evidence about Wittgenstein allows us to infer. I propose to do here the
latter. Historical links would run either from Wittgenstein to the pragmatist tradition or
from the pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein. I choose to investigate links of the latter
type,  hoping  that  the  connections  uncovered  actually  help  us  to  deepen  our
understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, albeit on some limited points. There is to my
knowledge no discussion of C. S. Peirce in Wittgenstein’s writings, only a reference en
passant in a conversation by Rhus Rhees,2 which remains unpublished (it is at all events of
peripheral interest), and, although there is quite a lot of discussion of William James, it is
perhaps focused on topics,  e.g.,  psychology and religious experience,  that  are not  so
specific to ‘pragmatism.’ If at first blush the idea of direct links seems not so promising – I
do not wish, however, to say that it is not – perhaps the role of intermediaries is worth
investigating,  and  this  is  what  I  shall  do,  focusing  on  ‘British  pragmatism,’  and
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F. P. Ramsey in particular. The expression ‘British pragmatism’ was indeed coined by Nils-
Eric Sahlin  to  characterize  Ramsey’s  philosophy,3 and  I  shall  extend  it  here  to  an
heterogeneous group that includes, alongside him, C. K. Ogden and Bertrand Russell – a
fuller picture should also include the more marginal figures of F. C. Schiller and Victoria
Welby.4 The presence of Russell might strike one as odd even in such a miscellaneous list,
but  one  should  recall  the  equally  odd  remark  at  the  end  of  Ramsey’s  “Facts  and
Propositions,” to which I shall come back:
My pragmatism is derived from Mr Russell.5
2 At all events, the focus of this paper will be Ramsey, and what manner of pragmatist
thinking he might have imparted in Wittgenstein. I shall therefore spend most of the
paper explaining in what sense Ramsey may reasonably be said to be a pragmatist, and
will in the last section explain how his critique in the late 1920s might have imparted a
key pragmatist idea in Wittgenstein.6
3 In order to forestall any misunderstanding, I should state plainly that I do not believe
Ramsey to be the chief inspirer of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, my aim is much more
modest; it is simply to try and shed light on one pragmatist idea that might have been
imparted  by  Ramsey  –  how  important  it  may  be  in  our  overall  account  of  the
development of Wittgenstein’s thought, I leave to others. There are certainly other topics
on  which  the  impact  of  Ramsey  is  more  readily  identifiable.  For  example,  G. H. von
Wright  and  Nils-Eric  Sahlins  have  shown  how  much  Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on
probability after 1929 owe to Ramsey.7 (To begin with, he corrected during his visit in
1923  a  mistake  in  the  first  edition  of  the  Tractatus.)8 Perhaps  more  to  the  point,
Wittgenstein’s  later  remarks  on truth should also  be  investigated,  not  in  terms of  a
‘redundancy’ theory but in terms of Ramsey’s pragmatism.
4 Still, to argue for anything remotely like an ‘influence’ on Wittgenstein is bound to be
controversial because of the habit of using Wittgenstein to pounce on philosophers he
was acquainted with –  Ramsey being here one of  the prime targets  alongside Frege,
Russell, and Carnap – as opposed to aiming at a less brutal but potentially more fruitful
appraisal of their intellectual relation,9 but also because, as we shall see presently, the
textual evidence can easily be mishandled.
5 One should first  recall  some facts.10 Ramsey first  heard about  Wittgenstein when an
undergraduate  at  Cambridge  (1920-23),  when  at  the  age  of  18,  he  translated
Wittgenstein’s Logisch-philosophische Abhandlungen into English – this is commonly known
as the ‘Ogden translation.’11 Ramsey went twice to Austria, in September 1923, for the
purpose  of  discussions  with Wittgenstein,  whom he saw for  a  fortnight  in  Puchberg
(where he was a school teacher), and in March 1924, when he underwent a psychoanalysis
with Theodor Reik in Vienna, lasting six months. During his stay, Ramsey only spend two
week-ends with Wittgenstein, again at Puchberg. The contrast between the two occasions
is striking: after his first meeting Wittgenstein, Ramsey wrote “I use to think Moore a
great man but besides W!,”12 while on his second visit in 1924, he wrote back: “He is no
good for my work.”13 As it  turns out,  however,  on that second occasion Ramsey was
himself absorbed in his psychoanalysis and hardly capable of philosophical work. This is
again in contrast with the first visit, when Ramsey discussed the content of the Tractatus
with Wittgenstein and tried to pick his brain for ideas on how to fix Principia Mathematica.
This last was a failure, as Wittgenstein thought Principia Mathematica “so wrong that a new
edition would be futile,”14 but their discussion of the Tractatus led to a remarkably astute
review of the book by Ramsey in the October issue of Mind.15
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6 Today, a promising young undergraduate such as Ramsey would be warned to stay away
from Wittgenstein, but this was not the mentality back then, and Ramsey wanted to learn
from Wittgenstein ideas that he would use for his own independent work.16 He pushed
Wittgenstein’s ideas in three directions: first, he used Wittgenstein’s idea that names of
properties and relations may occur in elementary propositions to develop a critique of
the distinction between universals  and particulars  in “Universals,”  secondly,  he used
Wittgenstein’s  conception  of  logic  in  his  analysis  of  belief  and  truth,  in  “Facts  and
Propositions” and “Truth and Probability,” and thirdly,  he tried to renovate Russell’s
logicism with help of ideas from the Tractatus. Only the second of these directions will be
the focus of this paper.
7 Ramsey was to meet again Wittgenstein briefly in 1925 at  Keynes’  in Sussex (on the
occasion of the latter’s marriage to Lydia); they apparently bitterly quarreled but this was
about psychoanalysis, not philosophy. They also exchanged a pair of letters on identity
through the  intermediary  of  Schlick  in  1927,  with Wittgenstein raising objections  to
Ramsey’s  definition of  identity in his  1925 paper “The Foundations of  Mathematics”;
again we see here how divergent their views on the foundations of mathematics were.17
Nevertheless, part of Wittgenstein’s intention when coming to Cambridge in January 1929
was to discuss philosophy with Ramsey, and they apparently met on a regular basis until
the latter’s untimely death a year later, in January 1930, at the age of 27. Wittgenstein,
who  was  deeply  moved  by  his  death,18 had  an  ambivalent  attitude  towards  their
discussions: in 1929, he described them as “energic sport” and conducted in “good spirit,”
with “something erotic and chivalrous about them,”19 but a year later he reminisced that
although he had a “certain awe” of Ramsey, the conversations “in the course of time […]
did not go well”; he thought Ramsey had an “ugly mind,” and that repulsed him.20
8 There are many traces of these discussions in Ramsey’s posthumous papers, including a
recently published set of remarks presumably dictated to Ramsey by Wittgenstein from
his own manuscript, MS 106, that may have served as a basis for his paper at the Joint
session in Nottingham in 1929.21 There are also a few remarks in Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß
referring to these conversations, among the many comments on Ramsey, more often than
not negative, that are mostly referring to his printed papers.
9 In order to assess the possible impact of these conversations and of Ramsey’s ideas on
Wittgenstein, one should, for obvious exegetical reasons, stick as much as possible to
texts from 1929. As I said, however, it is very easy to bungle one’s interpretation; one
obvious  but  common  mistake  is to  appeal  to  Wittgenstein’s  later  views  in  order  to
contrast them with Ramsey’s.22 That is presupposing that Wittgenstein had them in mind
in 1929 ready to use to rebut Ramsey, which is plainly false, and, supposing more rightly
that they occurred to him later, that this happened independently of any impact from
Ramsey: if one’s task is to assess the latter, then the procedure is perfectly circular. Thus,
it is better to assume that in 1929 Wittgenstein hardly did any thinking on his own for
years and that he was therefore barely able to articulate in clear terms a critique of his
Tractatus,  while Ramsey had already articulated an astute one in his 1923 review and
moved further along since.
10 One should also beware of the fact that Ramsey’s views evolved in the last two years of his
life, i.e., in 1928-29: it would thus be mistaken to assess the result of these conversations
by helping oneself without proper care to views expressed by Ramsey in papers published
in  previous  years.  Indeed,  Ramsey’s  major  philosophy  papers  were  all  published  in
1925-26:  “Universal”  and  “The  Foundations  of  Mathematics”  in  1925,  “Mathematical
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Logic”  in  1926,  to  which  one  may  add  the  posthumously  published  “Truth  and
Probability” written in the same year, and “Facts and Propositions” in 1927. His tragic
death in January 1930 meant that Ramsey could not complete any new philosophy papers
reflecting his views for 1928-29, but some important manuscripts were published in 1931,
as his ‘last papers.’23 There are important contrasts between the views expressed in these
two sets of papers, and this paper revolves around one of them. Alas, there is no clear
evidence that Wittgenstein read the ‘last papers,’ but it is clear that their content was
known to him through his discussions with Ramsey, because after 1929 he has abandoned
some views held in the Tractatus for reasons rather akin to Ramsey’s own change of mind.
11 My point is thus that it is a sine qua non condition that one understands Ramsey’s thought
in terms inclusive of these ‘last papers’ in order the assess the impact of his discussions
with Wittgenstein. In particular, one should first notice that almost all of Wittgenstein’s
remarks  openly  critical  of  Ramsey’s  views  concern  topics  in  the  philosophy  of
mathematics, where they obviously did not see eye to eye. One obvious topic is infinity:
Wittgenstein  always  stuck  to  the  potential  infinite  while  Ramsey  adhered  to  an
‘extensionalist’ conception that admits of infinite totalities. But Ulrich Majer has shown
that by 1929 Ramsey had already begun holding finitist  views that are critical  of  his
earlier stance in ‘The Foundations of Mathematics’ and ‘Mathematical Logic,’24 and I have
attempted in the past to show the relevance of these new views for our understanding of
the  development  of  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  of  mathematics.25 Brian  McGuinness’
disagreed with what he perceived as the gist of this work:
Ulrich Majer and Mathieu Marion for example think Ramsey taught Wittgenstein to
view mathematics in an intuitionist and even finitist way. […] it seems to me that
influence is  not  the right  word:  we might  better  remember Gilbert  Ryle’s  reply
when asked whether he had been influenced by Wittgenstein: “I learnt a lot from
him.”  Now  Wittgenstein  clearly  learnt  a  lot  from  Ramsey  and  came  back  to
philosophy with a knowledge of the thought of Weyl, Brouwer and Hilbert that he
would  not  have  had  otherwise.  But  he  certainly  did  not  adopt  a  position  near
intuitionism  under  Ramsey’s  influence  –  Ramsey’s  conversion  (if  such  it  was)
occurred after their meeting in 1925 and Wittgenstein’s enthusiasm for Brouwer
did not result from but was the reason for going to the 1928 lecture. It was not a
Cambridge product.26
12 McGuinness is certainly right about the fact that Wittgenstein was not ‘influenced’ by
Ramsey. There are clear indications that, in 1929, they shared a common ground on a
number of issues in the philosophy of mathematics, grounds that might justify labelling
them as ‘intuitionists’ or ‘finitists.’ Although it is undeniable that Ramsey changed his
mind, manuscripts show that he began to do so in 1928, before Wittgenstein’s return to
Cambridge.27 This being said, McGuinness is quite right in saying that, if Wittgenstein’s
views were indeed close to those of Brouwer, it was not as a result of Ramsey’s influence: I
have  argued  elsewhere  that,  in  order  to  understand  his  stance  towards  Brouwer’s
intuitionism, one ought to look at what he wrote on mathematics in the Tractatus, where
his view are already remarkably close to Brouwer’s;28 this also serves to understand his
rejection of Ramsey’s earlier views on foundations. For that reason, it seems also right for
McGuinness to deny any ‘influence.’ I should be sorry if, for my part, I spoke in such
terms; it is not possible and to some extend pointless to decide who influenced whom. But
it seems wrong merely to reduce for that reason the role of Ramsey to that of having
pointed out to Wittgenstein the existence of a number of papers by Hermann Weyl and
others expressing alternative views on the foundations of mathematics.
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13 More importantly, Wittgenstein kept coming back in his manuscripts to Ramsey’s earlier
‘extensionalist’ views on identity and infinity in order to criticize them, thereby giving
the impression that he actually took nothing from Ramsey – this is the view taken, for
example,  by  Wolfgang  Kienzler  in  his  careful  study  of  Wittgenstein’s  Wende.29
(Wittgenstein’s oracular style that make some of his statement appearing as if conjured
from nowhere else than his mind is also likely to mislead in this respect – I shall give an
example  of  this  below.)  In  making  a  proper  assessment  of  Ramsey’s  impact,  these
passages  should  not  only  be  dismissed  precisely  because  they  cannot  refer  back  to
Ramsey’s views in 1929, and therefore fail  to explain anything about their exchanges
during that year, but also, in the context of this paper, because they deal with issues in
the foundations of mathematics, where no pragmatist import could ever be detected. So
we better drop the issue, once these words of caution are expressed.
14 That his discussions with Ramsey had an effect on Wittgenstein’s thought is at the very
least acknowledged in no uncertain terms in the preface to Philosophical Investigations:
For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could
not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book [the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus,  M.M.].  I  was  helped to  realize  these  mistakes  –  to  a  degree
which  I  myself  am  hardly  able  to  estimate  –  by  the  criticism  which  my  ideas
encountered  from  Frank  Ramsey,  with  whom  I  discussed  them  in  innumerable
conversations during the last two years of his life.30 Even more than to this – always
powerful  and assured –  criticism I  am indebted to that  which a  teacher of  this
university, Mr. P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly applied to my thoughts. It is to
this stimulus that I owe the most fruitful ideas of this book.31
15 Even if we are to follow Wittgenstein and attribute to Sraffa a more significant role, the
bottom line remains that Wittgenstein acknowledged a debt to Ramsey and this simply needs to
be elucidated – there is no going around it.
16 It is true that Wittgenstein seems to imply in his preface that Ramsey’s input was merely
negative, and achieved only through criticism of his older ideas, but a narrow reading
that would deny any positive contribution cannot be wholly right, if only because the idea
of a purely negative critique, short of a Socratic elenchus, is hard to make sense of. The
following pair of quotations support this point. Ramsey is mentioned only once more in
Philosophical Investigations:
F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a ‘normative
science.’  I  do not know exactly what idea he had in mind,  but it  was doubtless
closely related to one that dawned on me only later: namely, that in philosophy we
often compare the use of words with games, calculi with fixed rules, but cannot say
that someone who is using language must be playing such a game. – But if someone
says that our languages only approximate to such a calculi, he is standing on the very
brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about
in  logic  were  an ideal language.  As  if  our  logic  were,  so  to  speak,  a  logic  for  a
vacuum. – Whereas logic does not treat of language –or of thought– in the sense in
which a natural science treats a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said
is that we construct ideal languages.32
17 One may usefully compare this with remarks jotted down by Ramsey in September 1929:
Logic,  i.e.,  the  laws  of  thought,  is  according  to  L((udwig))  W((ittgenstein))  a
consequence of analytic psychology. Es liegt im Begriff des Denkens dass man p . ≈ p
nicht denken kann.
Aber dieser Begriff des Denkens ist keiner naturwissenschaftlicher.
Die Psychologie von auswärts kann diesen Begriff gar nicht Benützen.
It is just like chess; in a game of chess you can’t have 10 white queens on the board,
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the emphasis is on chess. You can put them on the board if you like but that isn’t
chess.
So also in thought you cannot have p . ≈ p; you can write that if you like but it will
not be thought.
But I think we can define chess.
Can we define thought, and is there any such thing? What are its rules and who
plays it? It isn’t common, it is something to which we approximate by getting our
language clear.
“All our everyday prop((osition))s are in order” is absolutely false, and shows the
absurdity of interpreting logic as part of natural science.33
18 It is worth noting that none of the German sentences in this passage are to be found in
Wittgenstein’s  Nachlaß,  it  is  thus  reasonable  that  they  may  have  come  from  a
conversation with Wittgenstein. But Ramsey is also referring here to views harking back
to the Tractatus: the last sentence contains a quotation from 5.5563, while the idea that
one cannot think a contradiction is related to the impossibility of “judging a nonsense” in
5.5422. And, as Wittgenstein himself recognized above, Ramsey’s standpoint is the right
one: when he writes that logic is not a natural science, Wittgenstein is expressing an idea
he clearly  got  from Ramsey,  not  merely from having been effectively  criticized.  The
following will have a lot to do with this positive contribution.
 
2. Ramsey and British Pragmatism
19 Ramsey’s gave a concise expression of his own pragmatism in the last sentences of ‘Facts
and Propositions’:
In conclusion, I must emphasize my indebtedness to Mr Wittgenstein, from whom
my view of logic is derived. Everything that I have said is due to him, except the
parts which have a pragmatist tendency, which seem to me to be needed in order to
fill up a gap in his system. […] My pragmatism is derived from Mr Russell; and is, of
course, very vague and undeveloped. The essence of pragmatism I take to be this,
that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which
asserting it would lead, or, more vaguely still,  by its possible causes and effects.
(Ramsey 1990: 51)
20 This  passage  already  gives  us  two  clues.  First,  that  Ramsey  had  identified  what  he
believed to be a gap in the system of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and that he believed his
pragmatism would fill  it.  Secondly,  as  already mentioned,  Ramsey points  to Russell’s
pragmatism as the source of his own pragmatism.
21 As for the first clue, what would that gap be? My suggestion is that we look at Ramsey’s
review of the Tractatus and his critique of Wittgenstein’s analysis at 5.542 of ‘A believes p’
as “‘p’ says p.” Ramsey’s qualms had to do with the fact that he rejected Wittgenstein’s
grounding of the notion of ‘truth-possibility’ on the notion of ‘possibility of existence or
non-existence of states of affairs,’ in 4.3:
4.3 – Truth possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of existence
or non-existence of states of affairs.34
22 Recall here that ‘truth-possibilities’ allow one to form the usual truth-tables (4.31), given
that truth possibilities of elementary propositions are “the conditions of the truth and
falsity of propositions” (4.41), and that
4.4 – A proposition is an expression of agreement and disagreement with truth-
possibilities possibilities of elementary propositions.
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23 Using Wittgenstein’s own notation, this means, for example, that ‘not simultaneously p
and q’ or
(FTTT) (p, q)
24 is  the  proposition  that  expresses  disagreement  with  the  first  truth-possibility  and
agreement for the next three. What this means is that a proposition is identified with a
mapping from truth-possibilities of its elementary propositions to truth-values. In the
case at hand, the first truth-possibility, p and q being true, is mapped onto falsehood, the
next  three onto truth.  But  Wittgenstein notoriously grounds,  as  we just  saw,  ‘truth-
possibility’ on the notion of ‘possibility of existence or non-existence of states of affairs,’
and these depend on what objects there are in the world and their form. This ontological
grounding is the reason for my calling Wittgenstein’s theory ‘static,’ and my point here is
that Ramsey is going to replace it by a more ‘dynamic’ pragmatic theory. He voiced first
his criticisms in his review:
[Wittgenstein’s  theory]  enables  us  to  substitute  for  “‘p’  says  p.”  “‘p’  expresses
agreement with these truth-possibilities and disagreement with these others,” but
the latter formulation cannot be regarded as an ultimate analysis of the former, and
it is not at all clear how its further analysis proceeds.35
25 He then went  on criticizing  Wittgenstein’s  suggestion at  5.542  that  “‘p’  says  p”  is  a
coordination of facts by means of coordination of their objects:
But this account is incomplete because the sense is not completely determined by
the objects which occur in it; nor is the propositional sign completely constituted
by the names which occur in it, for in it there may also be logical constants which
are not co-ordinated with objects and complete the determination of the sense in a
way which is left obscure.36
26 In ‘Facts and Propositions,’ he also rejected this theory with a powerful argument, namely
that the meaning-explanations in the Tractatus are relative to a language:
We supposed above that the meaning of the names in our thinker’s language might
be  really  complex,  so  that  what  was  to  him  an  atomic  sentence  might  after
translation into a more refined language appear as nothing of the sort.37
27 And  he  pointed  out  that  the  presupposition  that  truth-possibilities  are  all  possible
clashed with Wittgenstein’s assumption that ‘This is both blue and red’ is contradictory –
this  being  the  notorious  color-incompatibility  problem,  one  of  the  first  flaws  that
Wittgenstein tried to repair in 1929, with well-known consequences. Ramsey nails the
point with the analogy of chess:
This assumption might perhaps be compared to the assumption that the chessmen
are  not  so  strongly  magnetized  as  to  render  some  positions  on  the  board
mechanically impossible, so that we need only consider the restrictions imposed by
the rules of the game, and can disregard any others which might conceivably arise
from the physical constitution of men.38
28 To see what Ramsey’s solution was, we need to deal first with the second of the above
clues.  Richard  Braithwaite,  who  was  probably  Ramsey’s  closest  friend,  described
Cambridge through the early post-war years in these terms:
In  1919  and  for  the  next  few  years  philosophic  thought  in  Cambridge  was
dominated by the work of Russell […] the books and articles in which he developed
his ever-changing philosophy were devoured and formed the subject of detailed
commentary and criticism in the lectures of G. E. Moore and W. E. Johnson. (ob.
1931)39
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29 During those years, Russell published “On Propositions: What they Are and How they
Mean” (1919), participated with H. H. Joachim and F. S. C. Schiller in a symposium, in Mind
on “The Meaning of ‘Meaning” (1920), which generated a debate in subsequent issues,
and, finally, Analysis of Mind (1921). In these, Russell went on developing (and abandoning)
what may be called a ‘causal theory of meaning’ which was indeed central to discussions
in Cambridge, as C. K. Ogden and I.  A. Richard would go on proposing a very similar
theory in The Meaning of Meaning (1923), and, as we shall see, both theories were to form
part the background to Ramsey’s “Facts and Propositions.” As a matter of fact,  when
Ramsey  spoke  above  of  Russell’s  pragmatism,  he  was  referring  to  this  theory.40
Wittgenstein, it is well known, was also to read carefully and criticize Russell’s Analysis of
Mind in chapter III of Philosophical Remarks.41
30 In “On Propositions: What they Are and What they Mean,” Russell expressed for the first
time the ‘causal theory’ in those terms:
According to this theory – for which I cannot make any author responsible – there
is no single occurrence which can be described as “believing a proposition,” but
belief simply consists in causal efficacy. Some ideas move us to action, other do not;
those that do so move us are said to be believed.42
31 It is interesting to note that Russell does not attribute this theory to anyone, he simply
claims that it is implicitly assumed by James, the only pragmatist whose writings he really
knew at that stage. As it turns out, Russell rejected it but in Analysis of Mind, he presents
his ‘causal theory’ in quasi-pragmatic terms:
We may  say  that  a  person  understand  a  word  when (a)  suitable  circumstances
makes him use it, (b) the hearing of it causes suitable behavior in him.43
The relation of a word to its meaning is of the nature of a causal law governing our
use of the word and our actions when we hear it used.44
32 C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards were to propound sensibly the same theory in The Meaning of
Meaning that Ramsey reviewed in Mind.45 Incidentally, one should note Russell’s claim in
those pages that understanding is, to use Gilbert Ryle’s words, a ‘knowing how,’ and not a
‘knowing that’:
It is not necessary, in order that a man should “understand” a word, that he should
“know what it means,” in the sense of being able to say “this word means so-and-
so.” […] Understanding language is more like understanding cricket: it is a matter
of habits, acquired in oneself and rightly presumed in others. To say that a word
has a meaning is not to say that those who the word correctly have ever thoguht
out what the meaning is: the use of the word comes first, and the meaning is to be
distilled out of it by observation and analysis.46
33 This is, I believe, the reason why Ramsey spoke of Russell’s pragmatism in the opening
quotation of this section.
34 It would be wrong, however, to conflate Ramsey’s theory in ‘Facts and Propositions’ with
these views of Russell  and Ogden & Richards,  because Ramsey’s theory is  more truly
pragmatic and because, on the key point which is his solution the problem note above in
the Tractatus, there is no antecedent in Russell and Ogden & Richards. As a matter of fact,
Wittgenstein criticized these last as follows:
The  essential  difference  between  the  picture  conception  and  the  conception  of
Russell,  Ogden and Richards,  is  that it  regards recognition as seeing an internal
relation, whereas in their view this is an external relation.
That is to say, for me, there are only two things involved in the fact that a thought
is  true,  i.e.  the  thought  and  the  fact;  whereas  for  Russell  there  are  three,  i.e.
thought, fact and a third event which, if it occurs, is just recognition. […]
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The causal connection between speech and action is an external relation, whereas
we need an internal one.47
35 This critique does not apply to Ramsey’s “Facts and Propositions,” as we shall see, since
he does not introduce any third element in modifying the ‘picture conception.’
36 Ramsey relies indeed here directly on Peirce,  whose writings he probably discovered
through C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards’ The Meaning of Meaning,48 published in 1923, which is
also the year of the publication of Chance, Love and Logic, quoted by Ramsey in his writings.
When he wrote in the above-quoted passage that
the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which
asserting it would lead […]
37 Ramsey merely expressed an idea one that one can already find in Peirce, who wrote in
“The Fixation of Belief” (1877):
our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires.
49
38 Furthermore, in “How to Make our Ideas Clear” (1878), Peirce claimed that “the whole
function of thought is to produce habits of action” and that to make explicit the meaning
of a belief
we have […] simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is
simply what habits its involves.50
39 These passages show that Peirce conceived of beliefs as habits and a guides to action.51 These
ideas are to be found almost verbatim in Ramsey’s ‘last papers’:
All belief involves habit.52
The ultimate purpose of thought is to guide our action.53
It belongs to the essence of any belief that we deduce from it, and act on it in a
certain way.54
40 What these snippets show is a direct influence of Peirce’s pragmatism on Ramsey. This
influence can be felt in two crucial stages, first in Ramsey’s use of these ideas to rectify in
‘Facts  and Propositions’  the  above blemish he  found in Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus,  and
secondly in the ‘last papers.’
41 Ramsey’s solution to the problems he raised in his review of the Tractatus,  discussed
above, consisted simply in identifying a belief in a proposition with the set of truth-
possibilities under which it is true:
Thus, to believe p or q is to express agreement with the possibilities p true and q
true, p false and q true, p true and q false, and disagreement with the remaining
possibility p false and q false. To say that feeling belief towards a sentence expresses
such an attitude is to say that it has certain causal properties which vary with the
attitude, i.e. with which possibilities are knocked out and which, so to speak, are
still  left  in.  Very  roughly  the  thinker  will  act  in  disregard  of  the  possibilities
rejected, but how to explain this accurately I do not know.55
42 In other words, according to Ramsey, who adopts here the pragmatist point of view, for
someone to believe in ‘p F0DA  q’ means to “act in disregard of the possibilities rejected.”56
This identification of belief with act is what I called the ‘dynamic’ element, with which
Ramsey corrects the ‘static’ conception of the Tractatus. (One also should note here, in
relation to Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell and Ogden & Richards quoted above that
Ramsey did not introduce a new element.)
43 Thus  both  Russell’s  and  Peirce’s  conceptions  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in
understanding Ramsey’s pragmatism and the manner in which he sought to rectify the
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Tractatus. For the second stage of this influence, one has to bear in mind that Ramsey’s
thought had evolved by 1929 – after all these last three quotations are from the ‘last
papers’ – and one cannot simply refer back to the views in ‘Facts and Propositions’ and
contrast them with Wittgenstein in order to emphasize the disagreements between the
two philosophers. One needs instead to show how the pragmatist insights gained early
evolved into the ‘last philosophy’ of Ramsey (hardly two years later), in order to make the
right sort of comparison with Wittgenstein. This requires, however, that one provides a
‘non standard’ interpretation of Ramsey’s philosophy.57 By this I mean the following. If we
follow, for example, Christopher Hookway, both Peirce and Ramsey defend an account of
belief which is ‘representationalist’ – this is not Hookway’s term – because it combines
two elements: representations, as they “display a logical structure which suits them for
use in inference,” and:
[…] representations that function as beliefs have a special role in the determination
of action which makes it appropriate to regard them as embodying habits of action.
58
44 This might right as a portrayal of Peirce, who held general beliefs to be representations,
but I think that this is not exactly true about the Ramsey of the ‘last papers’ for reasons
that I shall present in the next section.
 
3. Ramsey’s ‘Human Logic’
45 My starting point will be what Colin Howson called Ramsey’s ‘big idea,’ i.e., the idea that
the laws of probability are rules of consistency for the distribution of partial beliefs.59
Following the British tradition and Keynes in particular, Ramsey adhered to the view of
logic as the ‘science of rational thought,’ i.e., the science that “tells men how they should
think.”60 (Another influence here might simply be Peirce’s view of logic as ‘self-control.’)61
This  is  the  view of  logic  as  ‘normative’  that  Wittgenstein  mentioned in  Philosophical
Investigations,  § 81,  quoted  above.  Ramsey  also  used  Peirce’s  distinction  between
‘explicative’  and  ‘ampliative’  arguments,62 to  suggest  that  this ‘science  of  rational
thought,’
[…] must then fall very definitely into two parts: […] we have the lesser logic, which
is the logic of consistency; and the larger logic, which is the logic of discovery, or
inductive logic.63
46 The ‘larger’ logic, Ramsey also called ‘logic of truth,’ so we can divide the subject into a
‘logic of  consistency’  and a ‘logic of  truth.’  The former contains what Ramsey called
‘formal logic’; this is basically what we consider today as ‘logic.’64 His ‘big idea’ was thus to
have  seen  that  the  theory  of  subjective  probability  actually  belongs  to  the  ‘logic  of
consistency,’  as  a  generalization of  formal  logic.  In order to do this,  he re-described
formal logic as the ‘logic of consistency’ for full or ‘certain’ beliefs of degree 0 or 1 and
proposed to see his theory of subjective probability as generalization of this to partial
beliefs,  i.e.,  beliefs of degree from 0 to 1.  Therefore, the distinction between ‘logic of
consistency’ and ‘logic of truth’ does not overlap the distinction between certain and
partial beliefs:
What  we  have  now  to  observe  is  that  [the  distinction  between  the  logic  of
consistency and logic of truth] in no way coincides with the distinction between
certain and partial beliefs; we have seen that there is a theory of consistency in
partial beliefs just as much as of consistency in certain beliefs, although for various
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reasons the former is not so important as the latter. The theory of probability is in
fact a generalization of formal logic […].65
47 Reasons for this classification have to do with one of the many extraordinary features of
Ramsey’s  paper,  the  Dutch  Book  Theorem.  Following  Patrick  Suppes,66 one  may
distinguish  within  Ramsey’s  subjective  probability  theory  between  ‘structure’  and
‘rationality’  axioms.  One  of  the  rationality  axioms  is  the  well-known  ‘transitivity
principle,’ which states that, for all outcomes a, b and c, if a is preferred to b and b is
preferred to c, then a should be preferred to c. Ramsey commented on possible violations
of this principle in the following terms:
Any definite set of degrees of belief which broke [the laws of probability] would be
inconsistent in the sense that it violated the laws of preference between options,
such as  that  preferability  is  a  transitive  asymmetrical  relation,  and that  if  is  α
preferable to β, β for certain cannot be preferable to α if p, β if not-p. If anyone’s
mental condition violated these laws, his choice would depend on the precise form
in which the options were offered him, which would be absurd. He could have a
book made against him by a cunning better and would then stand to lose in any
event. (Ramsey 1990: 78)
48 With this remark, Ramsey stated without proof what is now known as the Dutch Book
Theorem –  a  choice  of  betting quotients  resulting  in  a  certain  loss  being  called  by
bookmakers a Dutch Book. The first explicit proof was given by Bruno de Finetti,67 in
complete  ignorance  of  Ramsey’s  work.  The  Dutch  Book  Theorem is  often  used  as  a
justification for the axioms of subjective probability theory. A typical claim derived from
it, made here by Donald Davidson, is that it shows that it is rational to act according to
that theory:
Because the constraints are sharply stated, various things can be proven about the
theory.  The  intuition  that  the  constraints  define  an  aspect  of  rationality,  for
example, can be backed by a proof that only someone whose acts are in accord with
the theory is doing the best he can by his own lights: a Dutch book cannot be made
against him.68
49 It is important at this juncture, especially since much has been made of Davidson’s debt to
Ramsey, to see the latter viewed the matter differently:
We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that
the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of
formal logic, the logic of consistency. They do not depend for their meaning on any
degree of belief in a proposition being uniquely determined as the rational one;
they merely distinguish those sets of beliefs which obey them as consistent ones.69
50 The thought is repeated a later on:
We found that  the most  generally  accepted parts  of  logic,  namely formal  logic,
mathematics and the calculus of probability are all concerned simply to ensure that
our  beliefs  are  not  self-contradictory.  We  put  before  ourselves  the  standard  of
consistency and construct these elaborate rules to ensure its observance.70
51 It is crucial that one reads these passages very carefully. One should indeed notice that in
these  passages  Ramsey  merely  claims  that  “the  laws  of  probability  are  laws  of
consistency.” There is no implication whatsoever in this passage that to be consistent is
to be rational or that to violate the principle of transitivity is to be irrational. The words
‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ are not used at all in that section, except, as a matter of fact,
only when the contrary is claimed, i.e., when Ramsey says that the laws of probability “do
not depend for their meaning on any degree of belief in a proposition being uniquely
determined as the rational one” (my emphasis).  This was a direct criticism of Keynes’
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views on probability,71 leading to the dismissal of his Principle of Indifference.72 Here too
Ramsey avoided claims concerning rationality, while emphasizing consistency:
The Principle  of  Indifference  can now be  altogether  dispensed with;  we do not
regard it as belonging to formal logic to say what should be a man’s expectation of
drawing a white or a black ball from an urn; his original expectations may within
the limits of consistency be any he likes; all we have to point out is that if he has
certain  expectations  he  is  bound  in  consistency  to  have  certain  others.  This  is
simply bringing probability into line with ordinary formal logic, which does not
criticize the premises but merely declares that  certain conclusions are the only
ones consistent with them.73
52 This textual evidence should show clearly that a shift – a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος – has
occurred, from Ramsey to Suppes and Davidson. That this shift is for the better or not is
not what is at stake here, we merely need to ascertain what Ramsey’s views were, and his
point clearly was not that inconsistency must be considered irrational. The common view
that Ramsey’s  theory is  about “an actual  human reasoner,  like you and me,  and not
[about] some ideal reasoner”74 is also misleading in this respect. The basis for this view
must be the opening paragraph of section 4 of “Truth and Probability,” entitled “The
Logic of Consistency”:
We may agree that in some sense it is the business of logic to tell us what we ought
to think; but the interpretation of this statement raises considerable difficulties. It
may be said that we ought to think what is true, but in that sense we are told what
to think by the whole of science and not merely by logic. Nor, in this sense, can any
justification be found for partial belief; the ideally best thing is that we should have
beliefs  of  degree  1  in  all  true  propositions  and  beliefs  of  degree  0  in  all  false
propositions. But this is too high a standard to expect of mortal men, and we must
agree that some degree of doubt or even error may be humanly justified.75
53 The reference to ‘mortal men’ implies a contrast with God, so the idea here is that the
‘ideal reasoner’ is God, who can reason, given his infinite powers, in terms of full and
certain beliefs that are also true. The point made later on in exactly those terms:
As has previously been remarked, the highest ideal would be always to have a true
opinion and be certain of it; but this ideal is more suited to God than to man.76
54 It is not to be denied that subjective probability theory, as the logic of consistency for
partial beliefs is,  by contrast, about humans. It is trivially so. Nevertheless, I find the
point misleading because the cognitive capacities of that ‘actual human reasoner, like you
and me’ are left unspecified by such formulations and may very well be idealized to begin
with and I think Ramsey did not conceive his ‘logic of truth’ in terms of such idealizations
at all. In a nutshell, there is no discussion the passages above of the theory of subjective
probability as providing an explanation of human actions but only as setting a ‘standard
of consistency’ that we should observe and there is no indication either that Ramsey
believed that the ‘actual human reasoner, like you and me’ has the cognitive capacities
needed always to observe that ‘standard.’ But I should first say a few more things about
the other part of the ‘science of rational thought,’ the ‘logic of truth.’
55 As  opposed  to  most  supporters  of  subjective  probability,  Ramsey  also  believed  in
‘objective’ or ‘statistical’ probability, which he called ‘frequencies.’77 The ‘logic of truth’ is
in fact concerned with these: given the “standard of consistency,” how do we adapt to
‘frequencies’? As Ramsey would put it: “we want our beliefs to be consistent not merely
with one another but also with facts.”78 As Ramsey reminds us, the human mind “works
essentially  according  to  general  rules  or  habits,”79 and  one  wishes  to  evaluate  such
‘habits,’  i.e.,  to  find  out  whether  the  degree  of  belief  an  habit  produces  fits  the
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frequencies or not, i.e., leads to truth or not.80 (This is why Ramsey spoke of a ‘logic of
discovery’ and, in potentially misleading ways, of ‘inductive logic.’)81 Ramsey was thus
hoping to provide through that procedure a justification for induction as a ‘useful habit’
so that one can agree that “to adopt it  is  reasonable.”82 In short,  a  belief  is  deemed
‘reasonable’ if it is obtained by a ‘reliable’ process.83
56 At this stage, however, Ramsey’s ‘logic of truth’ threatens to evaporate into a ‘reliabilist’
program,  which  would  fall  prey  to  Goodman’s  Paradox.84 But  this  issue  is,  again,
tangential to my attempt at clarifying Ramsey’s views, and I should emphasize instead
another  aspect  of  Ramsey’s  ‘logic  of  truth,’  which  is  better  captured  by  another
expression which he uses synonymously: ‘human logic.’85 Again, this expression is likely
to  mislead:  for  example,  one  might  think  that  Ramsey  had  in  mind  an  empirical
description  of  how  humans  actually  make  choices.  But  Ramsey  excluded  such
psychological  considerations  and  wished  to  retain  the  normative  character  of  logic,
which “tells men how they should think,”86 or “what it would be reasonable to believe.”87
So Ramsey’s overall classification should be as follows:
 
Ramsey’s Classification
57 And the situation is nicely summed up in this passage from Keynes:
[Ramsey] was led to consider “human logic” as distinguished from “formal logic.”
Formal logic is concerned with nothing but the rules of consistent thought. But in
addition to this we have certain “useful mental habits” for handling the material
with which we are supplied by our perceptions and by our memory and perhaps in
other ways, and so arriving at or towards truth; and the analysis of such habits is
also a sort of logic. […] in attempting to distinguish a “human” logic from formal
logic on the one hand and descriptive psychology on the other, Ramsey may have
been pointing the way to the next field of study when formal logic has been put into
good order and its highly limited scope properly defined.88
58 As I said earlier, Ramsey did not present his theory of subjective probability as providing
an explanation of human actions but only as setting a ‘standard of consistency’ that we
should observe, and he did not give any indication that he assumed that we possess the
cognitive  capacities  needed  always  to  observe it.  If  anything,  in  his  discussion  of
subjective probability theory, he pointed out an obvious obstacle to its applicability:
nothing has been said about degrees of belief when the number of alternatives is
infinite.  […] I  doubt if  the mind is  capable of  contemplating more than a finite
number of alternatives.89
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59 Thus Ramsey’s view was that we do not have the cognitive capacities necessary always to
observe the standards of consistency set out in both branches of the ‘logic of consistency’
and that it is precisely for that reason that he believed it necessary to add a further
branch to the ‘science of rational thought,’ whose concerns are precisely with what it is
‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ to believe, given that we do not have these capacities. In other
words, there is nothing in what Ramsey says about ‘human logic’ that implies that he
believed that it should be some sort of applied subjective probability theory, as it has
more  or  less  been  implicitly  taken  to  be  since  in  the  work  of  Jeffrey,  Suppes,  and
Davidson.  The shift  to the modern view thus consists  of  the conflation of  subjective
probability theory and the ‘logic of truth’ or ‘human logic.’ Once we have understood
what Ramsey’s ‘human logic’ is truly about, we can then factor in the pragmatism he took
on board via Russell, and we can thus begin to look at what he had to say about ‘variable
hypotheticals’ in 1929, and what possible connexions there are with Wittgenstein had to
say about ‘hypotheses.’
 
4. Ramsey’s Variable Hypotheticals and Wittgenstein’s
Hypotheses
60 My case  will  rest  on  the  reading  of  two passages  and on links  with  remarks  found
principally in one of the ‘last papers,’ “General Propositions and Causality.” In the first
passage, which deserves to be read carefully, Ramsey made plain that the “standard of
consistency” set by the ‘logic of consistency’ is “not enough”:
this is obviously not enough; we want our beliefs to be consistent not merely with
one another but also with the facts: nor is it even clear that consistency is always
advantageous; it may well be better to be sometimes right than never right. Nor
when we wish to be consistent are we always able to be: there are mathematical
propositions whose truth or falsity cannot as yet be decided. Yet it may humanly
speaking be right to entertain a certain degree of belief in them on inductive or
other grounds: a logic which proposes to justify such a degree of belief must be
prepared actually to go against formal logic; for to a formal truth formal logic can
only assign a belief of degree 1. […] This point seems to me to show particularly
clearly that human logic or the logic of truth, which tells men how they should
think,  is  not  merely  independent  of  but  sometimes  actually  incompatible  with
formal logic.90
61 This passage is quite astonishing. Among all things, Ramsey comes close to stating the
problem of omniscience which is linked with the principle of epistemic closure:91 it is of
course not true that, although one knows the axioms of, say, Peano Arithmetic, therefore
one knows all  arithmetical  truths which follow from them. Some, such as Goldbach’s
conjecture, are simply not yet decided,92 and Ramsey argues that there could situations
where one ought to be ready to assign to arithmetical truths a partial belief less than one
and thus to go against  formal  logic.  (Although Ramsey does  not  draw explicitly  this
inference,  his  remarks  also  imply  that  one  has  to  be  ready to  go  against  subjective
probability theory.) The conclusion here seems to be this: what is irrational for a perfect,
ideal agent may very well be rational for an agent with limited cognitive capacities.
62 In the second passage, Ramsey considers possible answers to the question “What is meant
by saying that it is reasonable for a man to have such and such a degree of belief in a
proposition?”:
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But fourthly it need mean none of these things; for men have not always believed in
scientific method, and just as we ask ‘But am I necessarily reasonable?,’ we can also
ask ‘But is the scientist necessarily reasonable?’ In this ultimate meaning it seems
to me that we can identify reasonable opinion with the opinion of an ideal person in
similar circumstances. What, however, would this ideal person’s opinion be? as has
previously been remarked, the highest ideal would be always to have a true opinion
and be certain of it; but this ideal is more suited to God than man.93
63 This is one of the passages quoted above as textual evidence that Ramsey thought of his
probability theory in terms of an “actual human reasoner, like you and me,” as opposed
to God, except this time he is talking about his ‘human logic.’ What follows, however, is
not another spiel about subjective probability and utility as one would expect. Ramsey
launches instead into a discussion that he admits to be “almost entirely based on the
writings of C. S. Peirce,”94 beginning thus:
We have therefore to consider the human mind and what is the most we can ask of
it.  The  human  mind  works  essentially  according  to  general  rules  or  habits;  a
process  of  thought  not  proceeding  according  to  some  rule  would  simply  be  a
random sequence of ideas; whenever we infer A from B we do so in virtue of some
relation between them.95
64 This point is repeated further on:
Let us put it in another way: whenever I make an inference, I do so according to
some rule or habit. An inference is not completely given when we are given the
premises and conclusion; we require also to be given the relation between them in
virtue of which the inference is made. The mind works by general laws; therefore if
it infers q from p, this will generally be because q is an instance of a function ϕx and
p the corresponding instance of a function ψx such that the mind would always
infer ϕx from ψx.96
65 The notion of ‘habit’ seems, therefore to play a key role in ‘human logic.’ As I pointed out
earlier,  Ramsey’s  idea was that  it  would allow us to evaluate,  praise or blame,  these
‘habits’:
Thus given a single opinion, we can only praise or blame it on the ground of truth
or falsity: given a habit of a certain form, we can praise or blame it accordingly as
the degree of belief it produces is near or far from the actual proportion in which
the habit leads to truth. We can then praise or blame opinions derivatively from our
praise or blame of the habits that produce them.97
66 This, Ramsey believed to be a form of ‘pragmatism,’ in the following sense:
This is a kind of pragmatism: we judge mental habits by whether they work, i.e.,
whether the opinions they lead to are for the most part true, or more often true
than those which alternative habits would lead to.98
67 In  “General  Propositions  and  Causality”  Ramsey  introduced  a  new  notion,  that  of
‘variable hypothetical,’ which actually stands at the heart of his ‘human logic.’ To see why
he needed this new notion,  it  suffices that we look at  ‘general  propositions’  in their
simplest form:
x ϕ(x) ® ψ(x)
68 In  “Facts  and  Propositions,”99 Ramsey  had  adopted  a  convention  that he  found  in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, according to which one reads the universal quantifier, “x ϕ(x),”
as a conjunction :
“ϕ(a) ∧ ϕ(b) ∧ ϕ(c) ∧…
69 and the existential quantifier, $x ϕ(x), as a disjunction:
ϕ(a) ∨ ϕ(b) ∨ ϕ(c) ∨…
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70 Thus, a proposition such as ‘All men are mortal’:
“x ϕ(x) ® ψ(x)
71 has to be interpreted likewise as a logical product, and Wittgenstein assumed at 4.2211
and 5.535 that these sums and products can also be infinite.100
72 However, to speak of an infinitely long product or sum does not have much sense within
‘human logic.’ If the human mind cannot contemplate an infinite object, how could one
use it as a “guide to action”?
A belief […] is a map of neighbouring space by which we steer. It remains such a
map however much we complicate it or fill in details. But if we professedly extend it
to infinity, it is no longer a map; we cannot take it in or steer by it. Our journey is
over before we need its remoter parts.101
73 Thus, Ramsey came to introduce the notion of ‘variable hypotheticals’:102
Variable hypotheticals or causal laws form the system with which the speaker meet
the future. […] Variable hypotheticals are not judgments but rules for judging ‘If I
meet a ϕ, I shall regard it as a ψ.’ This cannot be negated but it can be disagreed with
by one who does not adopt it.
These attitudes seem therefore to involve no puzzling idea except that of habit;
clearly any proposition about a habit is general.103
74 To see the evolution of Ramsey’s thought, one need merely to recall here the point made
at the end of section 2, above: according to Ramsey, in ‘Facts and Propositions,’ for S to
believe in ‘p & q’ or ‘p ∨ q’ means for S to “act in disregard of the possibilities rejected.”
In that paper, Ramsey explicitly adopted Wittgenstein’s reading of the quantifiers,104 but
he now realizes that this cannot be possible if the set of truth-possibilities is infinite.
75 The  interpretation  as  ‘rules  for  judging,’  above,  or  ‘fount  of  judgements’105 is  an
adaptation  of  the  reading  of  universal  quantifiers  as  ‘rules  for  the  formation  of
judgments’  or Urteilsanweisungen by Hermann Weyl. 106 Together with a reading of  the
existential quantifier as ‘judgement abstract’ or Urteilsabstrakte, it allows a constructive
reading of the two axioms of quantification theory:
“x ϕ(x) ®ϕ (a),
ϕ(a) ® $x ϕ(x),
76 with which Ramsey agreed in a note dating 1929, ‘Principles of Finitist Mathematics.’107
The notions are indeed the same, since the point of Weyl’s reading of the quantifiers is
that they are not reducible to conjunctions and disjunctions, and thus cannot be negated,
and this is precisely what Ramsey insisted upon:
[…]  when  we  assert  a  causal  law  we  are  asserting  not  a  fact,  not  an  infinite
conjunction, nor a connection of universals, but a variable hypothetical which is
not strictly a proposition at all, but a formula from which we derive propositions.108
77 Thus, variable hypotheticals are rules or schemata, not propositions,  they are therefore not
assessable in terms of truth and falsity, so Ramsey’s conception is, contrary to Hookway’s
claim quoted above, thoroughly non ‘representational.’
78 There are many points worth discussing at this stage, for example, Peter Geach’s ‘Frege
point,’109 against which this conception seems to be running afoul. For the purposes of
this paper, that Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier view of the quantifiers in terms of
conjunctions and disjunctions in favour of the very similar conception of ‘hypotheses’ is
something one can agree upon,110 and my claim is simply that this may indeed be the
result of conversations with Ramsey in 1929. One can illustrate the point with help of a
number of passages, such as this one:
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A hypothesis goes beyond immediate experience.
A proposition does not.
Propositions are true or false.
Hypotheses work or don’t work.
A  hypothesis  is  a  law  for  constructing  propositions,  and  the  propositions  are
instances of this law. If they are true (verified), the hypothesis works; if they are
not true, the hypothesis does not work. Or we may say that a hypothesis constructs
expectations which are expressed in propositions and can be verified or falsified.111
79 As  far  as  foundations  of  mathematics  are  concerned,  the  introduction  of  variable
hypotheticals forms part of Ramsey’s late move towards intuitionism or finitism,112 but
the  point  of  my  paper  is  not  to  examine  the  repercussions  on  his  philosophy  of
mathematics of the introduction of a similar notion by Wittgenstein, even though, as I
have  already  mentioned,  he  stood  probably  closer  to  Brouwer’s  intuitionism  in  the
Tractatus113 and that abandoning his earlier view of the quantifiers may just be a matter of
detail;  it  did  not  cause  any major  shift  away from the  positions  of  the  Tractatus  on
mathematics.114 Nevertheless,  I  think  that  it  is  certainly  worth  noticing  that  the
introduction of ‘variable hypotheticals’ in the context of human logic has nothing to do
with issues about foundations of mathematics; it is an argument of a pragmatic nature, whose
premises  are  already  contained  in  the  discussion  of  ‘human  logic’  in  “Truth  and
Probability”  as  well  as  in  the  pragmatic  rectification  of  the  Tractatus in  ‘Facts  and
Propositions.’115 The issue is thus not limited to the infinite case at all.116 This much comes
up in a passage from “General Propositions and Causality” where Ramsey tackles the
issue of praise that he already placed at the centre of ‘human logic’ – one sees here the
deep connexion with “Truth and Probability”:
[Variable  hypotheticals]  form  an  essential  part  of  our  mind.  That  we  think
explicitly  in  general  terms  is  at  the  root  of  all  praise  and  blame  and  much
discussion.  We  cannot  blame  a  man  except  by  considering  what  would  have
happened if he had acted otherwise, and this kind of unfulfilled conditional cannot
be  interpreted  as  a  material  implication,  but  depends  essentially  on  variable
hypotheticals.117
80 Ramsey’s reasoning here appears to be that when deliberating – or, to speak in the proper
jargon: when making a ‘choice under uncertainty’ – we ask ourselves what will happen if
we do this or that and we can answer in two ways: either we have a definite answer of the
form ‘If I do p, then q will result’ or we assign a degree of probability: ‘If I do p, then q will
probably  result.’  In  the  first  case,  ‘If  I  do  p,  then q will  result,’  we  have a  material
implication which can be treated as the disjunction ‘Not-p or q,’ which only differs from
ordinary disjunctions because we are not trying to find out if it is a true proposition: in
acting we will make one of the disjuncts true. In the second case, ‘If I do p, then q will
probably result,’ we are not thinking in terms of ‘Not-p or q’ anymore. As Ramsey put it:
Here the degree of probability is clearly not a degree of belief in ‘Not-p or q,’ but a
degree of belief in q given p, which is evidently possible to have without a definite
degree of belief in p, p not being an intellectual problem. And our conduct is largely
determined by these degrees of hypothetical belief.118
81 The pragmatic nature of Ramsey’s train of thought should by now be obvious, so one may
ask if there is any trace of this in Wittgenstein’s moves away from the doctrines of the
Tractatus in 1929, over and above the above change of mind on quantifiers. The idea is,
simply, that if Ramsey’s introduction of variable hypotheticals primarily motivated not
by considerations concerning the foundations of mathematics but by the above pragmatic
train of thoughts, then there should be a trace of it in Wittgenstein. It is already visible in
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the  passage  on  ‘hypotheses’  quoted  above,  where  the  context  is  obviously  not  the
foundations of mathematics, I shall endeavour to show this further with help of passages
from the early Middle Period.
82 Recall  that  an  essential  part  of  the  ‘static’  conception  of  the  Tractatus was  the
requirement that proposition and state of affairs must have the same logical multiplicity
for one to represent the other: 
4.04 – In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the
situation that it represents.
The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity.
83 In  manuscripts  from 1929  and  in  the  Philosophical  Remarks,  this  conception  becomes
‘dynamic’:
Language  must  have  the  same  multiplicity  as  a  control  panel  that  sets  off  the
actions corresponding to its propositions […] Just as handles in a control room are
used to do a wide variety of things, so are the words of language that corresponds
to the handles.119
84 This point is made in the context of a discussion of the role of intention in language, and
that  may explain  why it  has  been hitherto  unnoticed that  the  ‘dynamic’  conception
expressed here is new, it has no source in the picture theory of the Tractatus. The point is
also contained in remarks such as this:
Understanding is thus not a particular process; it is operating with a proposition.
The point of a proposition is that we should operate with it. (What I do, too, is an
operation.)120
85 It would be an exegetical blemish simply to assume that this new ‘dynamic’ view was
‘divined’ by Wittgenstein independently of any influence, while one can simply see here
the impact of Ramsey’s pragmatist critique of the Tractatus, and his concomitant view,
quoted above, that
the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which
asserting it would lead.
86 Furthermore, a ‘variable hypothetical’ or an ‘hypothesis’ may just be seen as an ‘handle in
a control room,’ precisely because the handles don’t ‘represent’ anything: they set off
actions. It is often said that the move to the later Wittgenstein involved an interest in
moods other that indicative, but as we can see here, it is deeper than that, it reflects a
change in his conception of the meaning of declarative sentences to begin with.
87 In order for this point to become obvious, I needed to take a very long detour into the
interpretation of Ramsey’s philosophy, a prerequisite to any evaluation of the impact of
his  discussions  with  Wittgenstein  on  his  evolution  from  the  Tractatus to  his  later
positions. I hope that this detour will have helped to shed light on this point, in a manner
that does justice to both philosophers.
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NOTES
1. For the first occurrence of this sort of move, see Rorty 1961.
2. I was able to consult a typed copy of Rhees’ notes at the von Wright & Wittgenstein Archives
housed in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki.
3. Sahlin (1997: 65).
4. Schiller  was  indeed the  first  in  Britain  to  describe  his  own philosophy as  ‘pragmatist’  in
“Axioms as Postulates” (1902), a paper that G. E. Moore described as “utterly worthless” (1904:
259), while Peirce considered it “most remarkable” (1931-35: 5.414). He figures significantly in
the sources to Lady Welby’s ‘significs,’ and they are both discussed C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards’
The Meaning of Meaning, e.g., at (1923: 272f.). They also get a mention in Russell’s My Philosophical
Development (1959: 14). A proper assessment of their legacy falls outside the scope of this paper.
5. Ramsey (1990: 51).
6. Thayer  (1981:  313)  already  expressed  the  hope  that  one  would  clarify  the  links  between
Ramsey, Wittgenstein and American pragmatism, but there are only an handful of studies such as
Glock 2005, McGuinness 2006, and Sahlin 1995, 1997, as well as lengthy discussions in Kienzler
1997 and Marion 1998.
7. See von Wright 1982 and Sahlin 1995, 1997.
8. See Sahlin (1997: 74-5 & 82-3, n. 48).
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9. One is  eager  to  quote  here  Paul  Grice  (1986:  62),  on J. L. Austin’s  treatment of  sense-data
theories such as H. H. Price’s in Sense and Sensibilia: “So far as I know, no one has ever been the
better for receiving a good thumping, and I  do not see that philosophy is enhanced by such
episodes. There are other ways of clearing the air besides nailing to the wall everything in sight.”
10. For an overview of Ramsey’s life, see Taylor 2006.
11. See Wittgenstein (1973: 8).
12. Wittgenstein (1973: 78).
13. Quoted in Sahlin (1997: 64), and Taylor (2006: 5).
14. Wittgenstein (1973: 78).
15. Ramsey 1923.
16. Today, on the other hand, any non-pledged philosopher mentioning Wittgenstein has to face
a group of commentators reminiscent of the Bandar-log in Kipling’s Jungle Book, starting “furious
battles over nothing among themselves.”
17. See Marion 1993.
18. See the testimony of Frances Partridge, ‘The Death of a Philosopher,’ in Partridge (1981: 169f.).
19. Quoted in McGuinness (2006: 23).
20. Wittgenstein (2003 : 15-7).
21. See Wittgenstein 2010, edited by Nuno Venturinha.
22. If my comments at the very end of htis section on the normative conception of logic are on
the right tracks, then an example of this sort of mistake is found in Hanjo Glock’s appeal to
Wittgenstein’s normative view of logic in Glock (2005: 59), in order to contrast it with a “purely
causal and behaviorist” conception he attributes to Ramsey. (On this last point, I hope to have
shown in section 2 that Ramsey’s views are not to be conflated with those of Russell and Ogden &
Richards.) 
23. These  papers  were  grouped  under  that  heading  in  R. B. Braithwaite’s  original  edition  of
Ramsey’s collected papers in 1931.
24. Majer 1989, 1991.
25. See Marion 1995 and (1998: chapters 4-5).
26. McGuinness (2006: 24-5).
27. See Ramsey (1991b : 33-4), where the notion discussed below in section 4 under the name of
‘variable hypothetical’ is already occurring in 1928.
28. Marion 2003, 2008.
29. See, for example, Kienzler (1997: 75-6).
30. This is strictly speaking incorrect as these discussions only took place between January 1929,
when Wittgenstein came back to Cambridge, and January 1930, when Ramsey died.
31. Wittgenstein (2009: 4).
32. Wittgenstein (2009: § 81).
33. Ramsey (1991a: 277).
34. Quotations from the Tractatus in this paper refer to the Pears & McGuinness translation in
Wittgenstein 1961.
35. Ramsey (1923 : 471). 
36. Ramsey (1923: 471). 
37. Ramsey (1990: 48). 
38. Ramsey (1990: 48). 
39. Braithwaite (1933a: 1).
40. For a detailed analysis of Ramsey’s debt to Russell’s theory, see the excellent paper by Juan
José Acero 2005. The discussion of Ramsey in this section is heavily indebted to this paper.
41. Wittgenstein (1975: §§ 20-38).
42. Russell (1919: 31).
43. Russell (1921: 197).
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44. Russell (1921: 198).
45. Ramsey 1924. For what differences they perceived between their theory and Russell’s, see
Ogden & Richards (1923: 141-2 n.). 
46. Russell  (1921:  197).  It  is  noteworthy that Russell  attributes the view in a footnote to the
behaviourist J. B. Watson.
47. Wittgenstein (1975: § 21). Wittgenstein’s critique is discussed, for example, in Kenny (1973:
123-30) as initiating one of the moves away from the picture theory of the Tractatus.
48. In his review of Ogden & Richards 1923, Ramsey (1924: 109) praised the appendix on Peirce.
See Ogden & Richards (1923: 432-44). It is quite possible that it is through them that Ramsey first
learned about Peirce.
49. Peirce  (1992:  114).  This  paper  and  ‘How  to  Make  our  Ideas  Clear’  were  reprinted  in  a
collection of  Peirce’s  essays,  Chance,  Love  and Logic (1923)  that  Ramsey read.  This  key idea is
repeated elsewhere, e.g., in the ‘Lectures on Pragmatism’ (1903), where Peirce wrote that “belief
consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as the guide to
action” (1931-35: 5.27).
50. Peirce (1992: 131). Again, the idea is repeated elsewhere, e.g., in ‘Elements of Logic,’ where
Peirce wrote that “the inferential process involves the formation of a habit. For it produces a
belief, or opinion; and a genuine belief, or opinion, is something on which a man is prepared to
act” (1931-35: 2.148).
51. Incidentally,  these  ideas  were  not  exactly  new  to  Peirce  and  can  be  found  already  in
Alexander Bain, who thought that “belief has no meaning, except in reference to our actions.”
See  Bain  (1859:  372).  The  point  was  first  made  by  Braithwaite,  who  also  showed  that  Bain
recanted later on (Braithwaite 1933b: 33). One may even trace the origin of this sort of thinking
to David Hume, according to whom, in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. V, part I, §
36: “custom” or “habit” is “the great guide of human life.”
52. Ramsey (1991a: 278).
53. Ramsey (1990: 153).
54. Ramsey (1990: 159).
55. Ramsey (1990: 46).
56. I owe the point to Acero (2005: 36).
57. The interpretation proposed in the next section is not entirely new, it is largely based on
Nils-Eric Sahlins’ The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey (1990).
58. Hookway (2005: 186).
59. Howson (2005: 157). This philosophical idea sets him apart from other early contributors to the
topic such as Bruno de Finetti. See de Finetti 1937.
60. Ramsey (1990: 87).
61. Ramsey (1990: 99-101).
62. Peirce (1992: 161). Ramsey’s use of Peirce’s distinction between ‘explicative’ and ‘ampliative’
arguments was motivated by the fact that he used the expression ‘inductive logic’ as a synonym
for  ‘logic  of  truth,’  while  he  believed  that  distinction  between  the  latter  and  the  ‘logic  of
consistency’  does  not  overlap  the  traditional  distinction  between  ‘deductive’  and  ‘inductive’
logic. The reason is clear from his definition of the validity of an inference, see Ramsey (1990: 82).
63. Ramsey (1990: 82).
64. Ramsey’s reasons are pretty much standard today, see Ramsey (1990: 81-2).
65. Ramsey (1990: 82).
66. Suppes 1956.
67. See de Finetti 1937.
68. Davidson (2004: 154).
69. Ramsey (1990: 78).
70. Ramsey (1990: 87).
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71. For example, at Keynes (1973: 15-6).
72. Stated at Keynes (1973: 121).
73. Ramsey (1990: 85).
74. Howson (2005: 145).
75. Ramsey (1990: 80).
76. Ramsey (1990: 89-90).
77. See Ramsey (1990: 84): “in a sense we may say that the two interpretations [frequentist and
Bayesian] are the objective and subjective aspects of the same inner meaning, just as formal logic
can be interpreted objectively as a body of tautology and subjectively as the laws of consistent
thought.”
78. Ramsey (1990: 87).
79. Ramsey (1990: 90).
80. Ramsey (1990: 92).
81. Ramsey’s  use  of  ‘inductive  logic’  is  idiosyncratic,  but  carries  potentially  confusing
connotations  of  Carnap’s  project  of  an  inductive  logic,  e.g.,  in  Carnap  1952  and  Carnap  &
Stegmüller 1959. See footnote 62 above.
82. Ramsey (1990: 94). This idea had been put forward by Ramsey already in 1922, in a paper to
the Apostles, see Ramsey (1991a: 301).
83. Ramsey even began to doubt in 1929 that this use of ‘reasonable’ is appropriate. See Ramsey
(1990: 101). This procedure would itself be inductive, but this ‘induction on inductions’ is not
viciously circular – for obvious reasons – and it would proceed by simple enumeration and thus
be finite.
84. As stated, e.g., in Chapter 3, of Goodman 197.
85. For example, at Ramsey (1990: 87).
86. Ramsey (1990: 87).
87. Ramsey (1990: 89).
88. Keynes (1933: 300-1).
89. Ramsey (1990:  79).  Decision theory usually involves an infinite set of alternatives and an
infinity of probability combinations, see, e.g., Davidson, Suppes & Siegel (1957: 7-8).
90. Ramsey (1990: 87).
91. This is the principle that says that if I know that p, and I know that p implies q, then I know
that q. This is, of course a mere epistemic variant of the principle of deductive closure.
92. Recall that Ramsey published a result which is a partial solution to the Entscheidungsproblem.
In this passage, he clearly speaks of decidability in these terms.
93. Ramsey (1990: 89-90).
94. Ramsey (1990: 90, n. 2).
95. Ramsey (1990: 90).
96. Ramsey (1990: 91).
97. Ramsey (1990: 92).
98. Ramsey (1990: 93-4).
99. Ramsey (1990: 48-9).
100. Ramsey used very this point in proposing a new definition of ‘predicative function’ in 1925
in “The Foundations of Mathematics”; see Ramsey (1990: 170f.). Wittgenstein opposed that move,
and came back to it in his notebooks, thus creating the impression that there was no common
grounds between him and Ramsey. But, as one can see here, Ramsey also abandoned these views
in 1929 and it is plainly exegetically wrong not to take this into account.
101. Ramsey (1990: 146).
102. The expression appears to originate in John Neville Keynes’s Studies and Exercises in Formal
Logic (1889).
103. Ramsey (1990: 149).
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104. Ramsey (1990: 48-9).
105. Ramsey (1991a: 235).
106. Weyl’s reading of the quantifiers was first presented in “Über die neue Grundlagenkrise der
Mathematik”  in  Weyl  1921;  see  Weyl  (1998:  97-8).  For  an  analysis  of  the  distinction  between
Brouwer and Weyl on quantification, see Majer 1988.
107. Ramsey (1991a: 197-202).
108. Ramsey (1990: 159).
109. Geach (1965: 459).
110. See, for example, the testimony of von Wright (1982: 151 n. 28) or Wittgenstein’s avowal in
his classes at Wittgenstein (1980: 119), or Moore (1959: 298). I have argued, however, in Marion
2008 that Wittgenstein got the term ‘hypothesis’ from Brouwer’s 1928 lecture in Vienna. This
does not imply that he realized his mistake hearing Brouwer, simply that he used instead of
Ramsey’s ‘variable hypotheticals’ or Weyl’s ‘Urteilsanweisungen,’ a term borrowed from Brouwer.
It is also important to note here that Brouwer uses the term while discussing the visual field, not
foundations.
111. Wittgenstein (1980: 110).
112. The  view  that  Ramsey  switched  to  intuitionism  under  the  influence  of  Weyl  on
quantification (among other things) was first propounded by Ulrich Majer (1989, 1991). It is also
acknowledged in Sahlin (1990: chaps. 5 & 6) and further developed in Marion 1995 and Marion
(1998, chap. 4), in relation to Wittgenstein.
113. Again, see Marion 2003, 2008.
114. I have discussed the relevant passages in Marion 1995, and in Marion (1998: chaps.4-6).
115. Conflating the pragmatic argument with issues in the foundations of mathematics is, I think,
the mistake made by McGuinness in the passage quoted above in section 1, that prevents him
from  properly  assessing  Ramsey’s  impact  on  Wittgenstein:  since  Wittgenstein’s  position  on
foundations does not change, McGuinness cannot see that he learned anything from Ramsey.
116. As far as the infinite case is concerned, there is a clear link with finitism in the foundations
of mathematics, which is clearly expressed in ‘General Propositions and Causality,’ as well, of
course, as in other notes from 1929, such as Ramsey (1990: 160): “So too there may be an infinite
totality, but what seems to be propositions about it are again variable hypotheticals and ‘infinite
collections’ is really nonsense.”
117. Ramsey (1990: 153-4).
118. Ramsey  (1990:  153-4).  One  could  pursue  the  line  of  thought  here  using  Ramsey’s  own
example of a man deliberating if he is to eat a cake or not (1990: 154-5), and this brings us back to
his famous example of the chicken that believes a certain caterpillar to be poisonous (1990: 40).
119. Wittgenstein (1975: § 13).
120. Wittgenstein (1979: 167).
ABSTRACTS
In  this  paper,  I  examine  the  transmission  of  some  ideas  of  the  pragmatist  tradition  to
Wittgenstein, in his ‘middle period,’ through the intermediary of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had
numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929. I argue more specifically that one must first
come  to  terms  with  Ramsey’s  own  views  in  1929,  and  explain  how  they  differ  from  views
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expressed in earlier papers from 1925-27, so a large part of this paper is devoted to this task. One
is then in a better position to understand the impact of Ramsey’s astute critique of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in conjunction with his pragmatism, and explain how it may have
set  into  motion  the  ‘later’  Wittgenstein.  I  then  argue  that  Ramsey  introduced  his  notion  of
‘variable hypothetical’ as a rule, not a proposition, on pragmatist grounds and that Wittgenstein
picked this up in 1929, along with a more ‘dynamic’ view of meaning than the ‘static’ view of the
Tractatus, and that this explains in part Wittgenstein’s turn to his ‘later philosophy.’
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